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1. INTRODUCTION: THE REDISCOVERY OF THE BODY AND OF THE WORLD. 
Cognitive Science is in some sense the science of the mind. But an increasingly 
influential theme, in recent years, has been the role of the physical body, and of the 
local environment, in promoting adaptive success. No right-minded Cognitive Scientist, 
to be sure, ever claimed that body and world were completely irrelevant to the 
understanding of mind. But there was, nonetheless, an unmistakable tendency to 
marginalize such factors: to dwell on inner complexity whilst simplifying or ignoring the 
complex inner-outer interplays that characterize the bulk of basic biological problem-
solving1. This tendency was expressed in, for example, the development of planning 
                                                 
1Some exceptions to this trend include the work such Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, Merleau-Ponty, M. (1942). La 
Structure du Comportment (A. Fisher, Trans.). France: Presses Universitaites de France. Work in 
Animate Vision and ecological optics (see Section 2 below) is clearly influenced by Gibsonian 




                                                                                                                                                    
algorithms that treated real-world action as merely a way of implementing solutions 
arrived at by pure cognition  (more recent work, by contrast, allows such actions to 
play important computational and problem-solving roles2). It was also expressed in 
David Marr’s3 depiction of the task of vision as the construction of a detailed three-
dimensional image of the visual scene. For possession of such a rich inner model 
effectively allows the system to “throw away” the world and to focus current 
computational activity int he inner model alone4. More generally, the whole vision of 
cognition as inner operations on internal world models reflects an explanatory strategy 
which might reasonably be dubbed isolationism5: 
(Isolationism) 
The world is (just) a source of inputs and an arena for outputs. And the body is 
just an organ for receiving inputs and effecting outputs (actions). The task of 
early processing is to render the inputs as an inner world-model of sufficient 
 
(1991). The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) explicitly acknowledge Merleau-
Ponty. There is a brief discussion of these historical root in Clark (1997), Chapter 8. 
2See e.g., Agre, P., & Rosenschein, S. (Eds.). (1996). Computational Theories of 
Interaction & Agency . Cambridge: MIT Press, Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1995). On 
Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549, Hutchins, E. 
(1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
3See Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman.  
4See Ballard, D. (1991). Animate Vision. Artificial Intelligence, 48, 57-86, Churchland, 
P., Ramachandran, V., & Sejnowski, T. (1994). A Critique of Pure Vision. In C. Koch & J. 
Davis (Eds.), Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
5Roboticists refer to this isolationist vision as the (increasingly discredited) idea of a 
simple Sense-Think-Act Cycle. See e.g., Malcolm, C., Smithers, T., & Hallam, J. (1989). An 





                                                
thickness to allow the bulk of problem-solving activity to be defined over the 
inner model alone. 
Isolationism, it is fair to say, is in increasing disrepute. But the precise shape of 
an alternative paradigm remains unclear. Anti-isolationist assertions range from the 
relatively innocent insistence that we won’t achieve a balanced vision of what the 
brain does until we pay more heed to the complex roles of body and world, to the self-
consciously revolutionary accusation that mind itself is not, after all, a special realm 
populated by internal models and representations so much as an inextricable 
interwoven system, incorporating element of brain, body and world -- a system which 
resists informative analysis in terms of the old notions of model, representation and 
computation6. The most radical anti-isolationist vision thus depicts human beings as a 
species of (so-called) post-Cartesian agent7. The post-Cartesian agent is a locus of 
 
6See Haugeland, J. (1995). Mind Embodied and Embedded. In Y.-H. Houng & J.-C. Ho 
(Eds.), Mind and Cognition (pp. 3-38). Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, van Gelder, T. (1995). 
What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? Journal of Philosophy, XCII(7), 345-381, Port, 
R., & Gelder, T. V. (Eds.). (1995). Mind as Motion: Dynamics, Behavior, and Cognition. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Thelen, E., & Smith, L. (1994). A Dynamic Systems Approach to 
the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Varela, F., Thompson, 
E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
7This vision is clearly contemplated in e.g., Haugeland, J. (1995). Mind Embodied and 
Embedded. In Y.-H. Houng & J.-C. Ho (Eds.), Mind and Cognition (pp. 3-38). Taipei, Taiwan: 
Academia Sinica and van Gelder, T. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? 
Journal of Philosophy, XCII(7), 345-381, though both authors recognize the large space of 
intermediate possibilities. The term “Post-Cartesian Agent” is from van Gelder, T. (1995). What 
Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? Journal of Philosophy, XCII(7), p. 381. See also 
Haugeland, J. (1995). Mind Embodied and Embedded. In Y.-H. Houng & J.-C. Ho (Eds.), Mind 
and Cognition (pp. 3-38). Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, p. 36, Thelen, E., & Smith, L. 
(1994). A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, p. 338, Port, R., & Gelder, T. V. (Eds.). (1995). Mind as Motion: Dynamics, 




knowledge, acts for reasons and has beliefs and desires. Yet she harbors no internal 
representations and resists analysis in terms of any cognitively important distinctions 
between “inner” and “outer” processes, between perception, cognition & action, or 
between mind, body, and world. 
I shall argue that the post-Cartesian vision is unconvincing and that a key move 
in the argument (a move I dub the “Cognitive-to-Coping Shift”) is both dialectically 
suspect and empirically unsound. More positively, I shall suggest that a weaker anti-
isolationist stance still requires some deep revisions in our understanding of the inner 
vehicles, the contents and the adaptive roles of internal representation and inner world 
models. The foundational and conceptual challenges are real enough, even when 
stripped of their radical post-Cartesian trimmings. 
2. INNER SYMBOL FLIGHT. 
The outright rejection of the notion of internal representation is usefully seen as the 
extreme limiting case of a (generally admirable) process of inner symbol flight. This 
process involves the progressive rejection of more and more of the apparatus and 
assumptions associated with the vision of cognition as the manipulation of chunky 
inner symbols. According to this simple (and historically important) vision, semantically 
sensible transitions between mental states are explained in terms of syntactically 
constrained transitions between inner symbol strings. These symbol strings contained 
discrete elements corresponding rather closely to the semantic elements identified in 
sentential descriptions of the relevant mental states. Thus, the thought that John loves 




                                                
independently manipulable elements standing for ‘John’ ‘loves’ and ‘Mary’8. 
 
8See Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A 




                                                
This vision of simple inner symbolic atoms (unstructured base items) 
corresponding rather closely to familiar concepts and relations enshrined in daily 
discourse was challenged by the development of distributed connectionist9 models. 
The ‘sentential paradigm’10 was replaced, in this research, by a vision of internal 
representations as distributed patterns of activity across a whole array of simple 
processing units. Such distributed patterns were allowed to overlap in semantically 
significant ways, giving rise to a variety of computationally significant side-effects 
including free generalization, damage-resistance, etc.11. 
More recently still, we have witnessed increased attention to the temporal 
dynamics of the inner representational vehicles. The use of e.g., single recurrent 
neural networks12 allows information to be encoded not just in instantaneous patterns 
of activity but in temporally extended processing trajectories. In these networks, much 
of the information-processing power resides in the way a current state allows or 
restricts future change and evolution. The progression has this been from a view of 
simple, atomistic inner symbols, to a notion of spatially distributed patterns, to a notion 
of spatially and temporally distrusted patterns. The inner vehicles of content, courtesy 
 
9See Rumelhart, D., & McClelland, J. (1986). On learning the past tenses of English 
verbs. In D. Rumelhart & e. al. (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the 
Microstructure of Cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 216-271). Cambridge: MIT Press.. 
10P.S. Churchland (1986). 
11See Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition:  Philosophy, Cognitive Science and Parallel 
Distributed Processing. Cambridge: MIT Press for discussion. 
12Elman, J. (1991). Representation and structure in connectionist models. In G. Altman 




                                                
of this progression, have come to look less like simple inner states and more like 
complex inner processes. 
The metamorphosis, moreover, is probably still incomplete. Some rather 
plausible next steps include seeing the inner vehicles as multiply functional and seeing 
the inner architecture as dynamically reconfigurable. Multiple functionality would mean 
that one and the same inner resource may play a variety of content-bearing roles13 
(perhaps varying in accordance with local content). Dynamic reconfigurability would 
mean that the inner structures are themselves subject to rapid change and 
reorganization, as when the release of a chemical neuromodulator causes two neural 
networks to temporarily ‘fuse’ and behave as one. 
The moral, then, is that our understanding of the nature of the (putative) inner 
vehicles of content is in a state of extreme flux, characterized by a rapid flight from the 
initial image of static, chunky unstructural inner symbols. This flight has, in addition a 
more content-related aspect. For at the same time as the inner vehicles become more 
complex, so the characteristic contents have become more partial and fragmentary. 
This is because the emphasis has shifted from isolationist forms of problem-solving 
towards iterated series of agent-environment interactions. This shift lies at the very 
heart of the agenda of a more embodied and environmentally embedded approach to 
cognitive science and is nicely exemplified by recent work in the field known as 
 
13For some hints of such content-sensitive complexity, see Knierim, J., & VanEssen, D. 
(1992). Visual Cortex: Cartography, Connectivity and Concurrent Processing. Current Opinion 




                                                
Animate Vision14. 
Recall Marr’s depiction15 of the task of vision. The task, according to Marr is to 
construct a rich inner model of the three dimensional visual scene on the basis of the 
available (two dimensional) input information. Work in Animate Vision, by contrast, 
depicts the task as, simply, the use of visual strategies to control behavior, in real-
world contexts, at as low a computational cost as possible. To this end, Animate vision 
avails itself of three central ploys. 
1). The use of task-specific cues and shortcues. 
2). The use of body-centered (egocentric) strategies. 
3). The use of repeated environmental interactions. 
 
14Ballard, D. (1991). Animate Vision. Artificial Intelligence, 48, 57-86. 
15Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. 
Task-specific cues and shortcues include, for example, the use of ‘personalized’ 
idiosyncratic strategies such as searching for bright yellow (a cheap, easy visual cue) 
when searching for my coffee cup (which is canary yellow). Egocentric strategies 
include the use of so-called “deictic pointers” (see below). And repeated 




                                                
of a visual scene retrieving specific information only as and when required. 
The case of deictic pointers merits a longer look. A pointer in classical Artificial 
Intelligence, is an inner state that can function in self-contained computational routines 
but which can also “point to” other data structures16. This pointing allows the retrieval, 
when required, of more detailed information, and the effective binding of certain items 
of information to others. Such binding can be temporary, as when we bind certain 
features (e.g., bright yellow) to certain current visual locations (top left of visual field). 
Deictic pointers, however, are not inner markers but actual bodily orientations 
(such as saccadic eye movements) that play the same kind of particular aspect of a 
visual scene, we may both retrieve more detailed information and achieve a kind of 
temporary variable binding in which we associate the detected features with a given 
spatial location. A further example is the binding of a reaching-and-grasping routine to 
a target object using what is informally called a “do-it-where-I’m-looking” strategy. 
Here, the system is set up so that the grasping motion is directed to the fixated visual 
location. In all these cases: 
 
16See e.g., Pylyshyn, Z. (Ed.). (1987). The Robots Dilemma: The Frame Problem in 
Artificial Intelligence . Norwood: Ablex. 
The external world is analogous to computer memory. When fixating a location, 




                                                
location. Changing gaze is analogous to changing the memory reference in a 
silicon computer. 
D. Ballard, M. Hayhoe, P. Pook & R. Rao 
“Deictic Codes for the Embodiment of 
Cognition” Behavioral & Brain Sciences (in 
press), p. 6. 
The general thrust of the Animate vision research, then, is that bodily actions 
(such as saccadic eye motions) play vital computational roles, and that repeated 
agent-environment interactions obviate much of the need to create all-purpose, 
detailed internal world models. Instead, we visit and re-visit different aspects of the 
scene as and when required, allowing the world to function as “its own best model”. 
The research program is this staunchly anti-isolationist. But it is not by any means 
‘post-Cartesian’ -- it does not reject the ideas of internal models and representations, 
so much as reconfigure them in sparse and more interactive image. We thus read of 
‘inner databases’ that associate objects (e.g., my car keys) and locations (on the 
kitchen table), of ‘internal featured representations’, ‘indexical representations’, and 
so on. What is being rejected is this not the notion of inner content-bearing states per 
se, but rather the much stronger notion of rich, memory-intensive, all-purpose forms of 
internal representation. 
A similar conclusion is suggested by work17 in real-world robotic navigation, in 
which, knowledge of location is encoded as a perceptio-motor routine that will actually 
 




                                                
move the robot  from its present position to the desired spot. In this way, the inner 
map is itself the controller of the appropriate action. There is no need for a further 
system to access the ‘map’ and to plan a route. Instead, the knowledge is at once 
both descriptive and prescriptive18 -- a dual nature that affords great economies both 
in terms of response-time and computational effort. 
The crucial distinction, it seems to me, is thus not between representational and 
non-representational solutions so much as between action-neutral forms of internal 
representation (which may increase flexibility but require additional computational 
work to specify a behavioral response) and action-oriented forms (which build the 
response into the representation itself). 
The best work in Animate vision and real-world robotics, I claim, suggests at 
most that the use of truly action-neutral internal representation may be rather rare in 
biological cognition (my own view discussed briefly in Section 5 below, is that the use 
of such representations coincides, rather exactly, with the possession of a rich public 
language). Such conclusions are radical and challenging. But they fall well short of a 
full post-Cartesian rejection of inner models and representations. What considerations 
might drive us to question the idea of inner content-bearers tout court? 
 
18For more on this theme, see Millikan, R. (to appear). Pushmepullyou Representations. 




                                                
3. RADICAL INTERACTIONISM. 
One leading anti-representationalist argument19 turns on the presence of dense, 
reciprocal causal exchanges uniting agent and environment in a complex web of 
mutual influence. Under such conditions, it is argued, the kind of de-composition and 
analysis that works so well int he case of e.g., a contemporary computer program 
simply gets no foothold. The problem (it is suggested) is that the notion of x 
representing y is too one-way and too simplistic to do justice to cases in which x is 
continuously affecting and being affected by y and vice versa. Yet typical agent-
environment interactions often present just such a complex and circular causal profile. 
Consider ballroom dancing. As you dance, your motions (if you are a good 
dancer!) Are both continuously influenced by an influenced upon, those of your 
partner: the two sets of motions “co-evolve” in a highly interdetermined way. Not is the 
presence of two human agents essential to the phenomenon. The same holds true as 
you windsurf: you constantly affect and are affected by the set of your rig. Van 
Gelder20 makes the same point using the example of the Watt (or centrifugal) governor 
-- a device which maintains a steam engine at a steady speed by both affecting and 
 
19This argument is the centerpiece of van Gelder, T. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If 
Not Computation? Journal of Philosophy, XCII(7), 345-381 and is also visible in van Gelder, T., 
& Port, R. (1995). It's About Time: An Overview of the Dynamical Approach to Cognition. In R. 
Port & T. v. Gelder (Eds.), Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition (pp. 1-
44). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Thelen, E., & Smith, L. (1994). A Dynamic Systems Approach 
to the Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Varela, F., Thompson, 
E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Other anti-
representationalist arguments are considered in Clark (1997). 
20van Gelder, T. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? Journal of 
Philosophy, XCII(7), 345-381. This example is treated in detail in Clark, A., & Toribio, J. 




                                                
being affected by the engine speed. Such episodes of mutual influence were much 
discussed both in early cybernetics21 and in the work of the french phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty22. 
 
21For example, W. Ross Ashby’s Introduction to Cybernetics (Wiley, 1956). 
22Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior (Beacon, 1963). Originally La 




                                                
Where such continuous, dense, circular causal influence obtains, it is argued, the 
tools of representational (and computational) analysis run aground. The idea of 
explaining the shape of the on-going agent-environment interaction by depicting an 
inner state as representing an outer one is coarse and distortive. Instead, inner and 
outer co-evolve in a mathematically precise way that is best captured (so the 
argument goes) by the use of coupled differential equations in which the current value 
of certain internal variables appear as parameter setting in the evolution equation for 
the external system and vice versa23. Fortunately, the details of such a dynamical 
systems model are unimportant for present purposes24. What matters is rather the 
 
23For an accessible introduction to these dynamical approaches, see Kelso (1995). A 
classic text is Abraham, R., & Shaw, C. (1992). Dynamics -- The Geometry of Behavior. 
Redwood, CA: Addision-Wesley. 




                                                
general shape of the argument. Van Gelder25 puts it well;  
The internal operation of a system interacting with an external world can be so 
subtle and complex as to defy description in representational terms 
Ibid, p. 381. 
 
25van Gelder, T. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? Journal of 
Philosophy, XCII(7), 345-381. 
Before responding to this argument, it is worth pausing to clarify the challenge. 
For what is at issue is not the status of certain systems (ourselves, for example) as 
representers. That is a given. We surely do represent our world, our past, our possible 
futures, our absent friends and so on. We think of these things and states of affairs 
and thus represent them to ourselves. What is not a given (and what is at issue here) 
is that we use internal representations to do so. The point (and I think it is a good one) 
is that the notion that cognition involves internal representations (and computations 
defined over them) is meant to be not a simple rehearsal of the fact that we are 
thinkers, but a substantial and explanatorily potent empirical hypothesis: the kind of 
thing that could indeed turn out to be false. The claim, to a first approximation, is that 
there are distinct, identifiable inner resources whose systemic or functional role is to 




                                                
This notion of internal stand-ins is however, itself ambiguous. It is ambiguous26 
between a weak notion, in which x ‘stands in’ for y if x is an inner resource that a) 
carries information about y and b) is used to control behavior, and a strong notion in 
which the inner resource must be capable of functioning as a genuine surrogate, i.e., 
be capable of systematically controlling appropriate behavior even if y is absent or 
non-existent. A neural population27 closely keyed to bodily orientation and used to 
control skilled action may thus be counted as a kind of weak stand-in. And even this 
weakly representational gloss tells us something useful about the purpose of the 
neuronal population and may shed light on larger scale systemic organization (we may 
see which other neuronal populations access that specific body of information and 
hence gain insights into their roles). But such a population, though it engages in 
information-based control of action, need not be capable of driving appropriate actions 
in the absence of the (weakly represented) state of affairs. It is this capacity to act as 
 
26See Clark, A., & Grush, R. (1997). Towards a Cognitive Robotics (PNP Technical 
Report No. ). Washington University in St. Louis.. 
27For example, the posterior parietal neuronal population in the rat which encodes 
information about which way the rat’s head is facing and which is exploited in radical maze 




                                                
an inner surrogate in the absence of the target environment feature that I suggest, 
characterizes the strongest and most conceptually unequivocal cases of internal 
representation28. 
 
28David Israel (Bogdan on Information, Mind & Language, vol 3:2:1988, p. 123-140) 




                                                
The problem that I wish to highlight should not be apparent. The entire argument 
concerning the circular causal complexity of agent-environment interactions is vitiated, 
I believe, by its failure to engage the issue of strong representation. All the examples 
share (and must share) a certain problematic feature, viz, they are all cases in which 
the target behavior is continuously driven by the relevant environmental parameter. 
Yet a major motivation for the positing internal representations in the first place is to 
explain our puzzling capacity to go beyond tightly coupled agent-world interactions 
and to coordinate our activities and choices with the distal, the possible and the non-
existent. The notion of internal representation is thus grounded in the notion of real 
inner surrogates and is merely extended (perhaps problematically) to the case of 
(merely) information-bearing inner states. This helps to explain why the best cases for 
the argument-from-continuous-reciprocal-causation may strike us as rather poor 
example of traditionally cognitive phenomena. For they depend crucially on the 
constant presence of the relevant environmental factors and thus do not strike us as 
especially “representation-hungry”29 scenarios in the first place. Properly 
representation-hungry scenarios would be planning next year’s vacation, using mental 
imagery to count the number of windows in your old house, doing mental arithmetic, 
dreaming, etc., etc. 
 




                                                
The dialectical situation is, however, rather delicate. For the anti-
representationalist may now reply that the point of the argument, in part, is to suggest 
that these traditional cases (of what might be termed ‘environmentally de-coupled 
reason) are in fact empirically marginal and that the bulk of intelligent response 
displays precisely the richly interactive profile the argument highlights. Environmentally 
de-coupled reason, it is claimed, is at best a ‘tip of the iceberg’ phenomenon. What is 
being promoted is thus a shift of emphasis away from off-line cogitation and onto real-
time interactive engagement30 -- a kind of ‘cognitive-to-coping’ shift. 
This shift in emphasis is welcome. From both an evolutionary and a 
developmental31 point of view, real-world real-time responsiveness is clearly in some 
sense primary. But as part of any general anti-represenationalist argument, the move 
is not dialectically suspect and empirically flawed. The problem is that the recognition 
that the richly interactive case is biologically basic is, as we shall see, perfectly 
comparable with the claim that ‘off-line’ environmentally de-coupled reason is not the 
mere tip of the adaptive iceberg. The way to forge a genuinely cognitive science of 
embodied, environmentally embedded agency is, I believe, to look harder for the 
bridges between densely coupled and strongly representationally mediated forms of 
adaptive success. Such bridges are at the heart of the conciliatory position I dub 
 
30This move is explicitly made in Haugeland, J. (1995). Mind Embodied and Embedded. 
In Y.-H. Houng & J.-C. Ho (Eds.), Mind and Cognition (pp. 3-38). Taipei, Taiwan: Academia 
Sinica and is also clearly in evidence in van Gelder, T., & Port, R. (1995). It's About Time: An 
Overview of the Dynamical Approach to Cognition. In R. Port & T. v. Gelder (Eds.), Mind as 
Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition (pp. 1-44). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
31See Thelen, E., & Smith, L. (1994). A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development 




                                                
‘minimal Cartesianism’, and to which I now turn. 
4. MINIMAL CARTESIANISM. 
Minimal Cartesianism seeks to locate the roots of pure contemplative reason in the 
richly interactive settings emphasized int he recent work on embodied cognition 
(Sections 2 and 3 above). Thus consider the phenomenon of skilled reaching32. 
Smooth, skilled reaching involves the use of proprioceptive feedback -- signals that tel 
the brain how the arm is oriented in space. But the timing of these signals poses a 
problem. The minimal delay between the onset and the use of such information looks 
to be between 200 and 500 milliseconds33. Yet we make essential trajectory 
corrections, that look to be governed by such feedback, within the first 70 
milliseconds34 of reaching. How does nature turn the trick? 
This problem of requiring feedback before it is practically available, crops up in 
industry too: in chemical plants, bioreactors and so forth35. One common solution, in 
these cases, is to add a ‘forward model’ or ‘emulator’ into the systems. This is a 
circuit that takes as input a specification of both the previous state of the system and 
 
32I borrow this case from Grush, R. (1995). Emulation & Cognition. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of California. An extended treatment is available in Clark, A., & Grush, R. (1997). 
Towards a Cognitive Robotics (PNP Technical Report No. ). Washington University in St. Louis. 
33This figure is established by, for example, using artificial vibrators strapped to the 
tendons to disrupt proprioceptive signal from the muscle spindles, and timing the gap between 
such disruptive input and alterations to the arm motion itself (see Dennier van der Gon, 1988, 
Redon et al., 1991).  
34See van der Meulen et al., 1990, Grush, R. (1995). Emulation & Cognition. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of California. 
35See Grush, R. (1995). Emulation & Cognition. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 




                                                
the commands just issued, and that gives as output a prediction of the feedback that 
should later arrive. The emulator thus generates a kind of mock feedback signal 
available substantially in advance of the real thing. 
Nature, it now seems, may deploy much of the same strategy. There is a fair 
body of neuroscientific evidence36 that suggests that neural circuitry spanning the 
cortico-spinal tract, the red nucleus, the inferior drive, the contralateral debate and 
cerebellar cortex may be playing just such a role. Such circuitry looks to take a copy of 
the afferent motor command and to output a fast prediction of the feedback later due 
arrive by the slow 200-500 millisecond route. 
The same trick has been replicated in a variety of neural network37 models. What 
matters for our purposes, however, is an additional conjecture. It is the conjecture38 
that the biological emulator circuit plays a dual role. This dual role involves first the 
fine tuning of on-line reaching (the normal case, in which the emulator circuit acts as 
an aid to smooth real-time reaching). And second, the production of visuo-motor 
imagery allowing the off-line mental rehearsal of motor routines. In the later case, the 
emulator circuit is running alone, de-coupled from the real-world action system. Such 
an additional role for the very same emulator circuitry implicated in real reaching is 
 
36See Ito, M. (1984). The Cerebellum & Neural Control: Raven Press, Kawato, M., 
Furukawa, K., & Suzuki, R. (1987). A hierarchical neural network model for the control and 
learning of voluntary movement. Biological Cybernetics, 57, 169-185. 
37Kawato, M. (1990). Computational schemes and neural network models for formation 
and control of multijoint arm trajectory. In W. T. Miller III, R. Sutton, & P. Werbos (Eds.), 
Neural Networks for Control. Cambridge: MIT Press, Wolpert et al. (1995). 




                                                
independently plausible and helps explain some otherwise puzzling results. These 
include the robust finding that mental rehearsal can actually improve sports skills39 
and the activity of the cerebellum (generally thought of as a motor area) during mental 
imagery40. 
 
39Fetz & Landers (1983). 
40Decety et al. (1990). 
Motor emulation circuitry, if this is correct, is both an aid to fluent, real-world 
action and a support for independent, environmentally-decoupled mental rehearsal. It 
is a minimally Cartesian mental tool, but one that is parasitic upon adaptations closely 
geared to the promotion of real-time agent-environment interactions. As a result, the 
kinds of content that get represented are closely tied to the bio-mechanics and action-
taking profile of the agent. And the form of the inner vehicles of content is left quite 
open -- such vehicles may involved complex temporally extended processes, as 
indicated in Section 2. 
Given such a profile, we can see why isolationist methodologies and 
assumptions are inadequate even in the case of certain kinds of environmentally 




both contents and mechanisms being profoundly informal by the agents real-time 
interactive purposes. Once again, however, the failure of isolationism should not be 
seen as an invitation to scepticism about representation and inner models. In the 
emulator case, it is clearly apparent that we are dealing with identifiable circuitry 
whose functional role is to model specific aspects of extra-neural (in this case bodily) 
reality. Yet this inner modeling is of a type that is perfectly continuous with the various 
morals  and emphasizes suggested by the action-oriented research discussed earlier. 
The conciliatory position that I favor this involves combining the stress on real-world, 
real-time action with a search for the biologically basic roots of more decoupled forms 
of thought and problem-solving. It is only by confronting the latter class of cases that 
representationalism can be given a fair trial. 
5. SCALING, RATIONALITY AND COMPLEXITY. 
Minimal Cartesianism aims to build bridges between the recent emphasis of richly 
interactive tasks and the more traditionally cognitive focus on decoupled reason. To 
that end it stresses the use of multiple, partial, action-oriented inner models and of 
deictic, idiosyncratic and action-oriented internal representations. The compelling 
question, at this point becomes whether we mist counteract, in addition to these, inner 
resources that have much of the look of classical symbolic models. Can we hope to 
explain the full gamut of human cognition without at some point reinventing the original 
image of context-neutral, rich, action-independent, highly manipulable inner symbolic 
structures? 
It is, I think, worth a try! More accurately, what may be worth a try is an approach 




                                                
encodings but which ties then very closely to our experiences with public language 
and other externalizable and interpersonally shareable symbol systems. Complex 
human cognition would then be depicted as the fecund interface between a variety of 
action-oriented internal resources and a larger web of linguistic competence and 
cultural tools and practices. 
This larger web (or ‘scaffolding’) acts so as to substantially alter the 
computational spaces that can be explored by our form of basic, on-board biological 
reason. A classic example41 is the use of pen and paper to expand our basic 
mathematical horizons, allowing us to use an iterated sequence of simple inner 
computations (7 x 7, 4 x 4) to solve more complex problems (such as 777 x 444). 
Public language, I elsewhere argue plays a wide variety of similar roles42. The mere 
act of labeling, as Dennett43 points out, affords great economies of search and 
classification. While the capacity for linguistic rehearsal may, according to Ray 
Jackendoff44, enable us to attend to the details of our own thoughts and thus open up 
new possibilities of reflection and analysis45. External artifacts and social organizations 
 
41Rumelhart, D., & McClelland, J. (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. 
In D. Rumelhart & e. al. (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the 
Microstructure of Cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 216-271). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
42Clark (in press), Magical words: How language augments human cognition, in P. 
Carruthers (ed) Thought & Language. 
43Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
44Jackendoff, R., How language helps us think, Pragmatics & Cognition 4:1:1996, p. 1-
34. 




                                                
likewise alter and transform the tasks that individual brains need to perform. And Ed 
Hutchins46 offers a persuasive account of ship navigation in which it is the overall 
system comprising multiple brains, bodies and instruments that ‘solves’ the problem. 
Each crew member within this larger nexus, merely monitors and responds to certain 
conditions, and alters a few aspects of the shared work space so as to support the 
activity of the others. The whole process constitutes an environmentally extended 
computational flow in which props and artifacts (such as nautical slide rules) also play 
a major role. 
The minimal Cartesian treatment of basic biological reason may (just may) thus 
scale-up so as to illuminate the full panoply of human thought and reason. But it will 
only do so if we take the issue of external scaffolding very seriously and recognize the 
special virtues of public language: the one action-neutral symbolic code we know 
ourselves and possess. One implication of this approach to the scaling problem is that 
we will need, at times, to study these larger systems (of multiple communicating brains 
and artifacts) as organized wholes and to recognize extended computational 
processes spanning the boundaries between brain, body and world. Such assertions 
can easily be mistaken for antipathy towards the study of the inner resources and 
processes. But the real challenge, once again, is to interlock the two approaches and 
 




                                                
thus to relocate individual human reason in its proper ecological niche. 
All thus raises questions about the notion of human rationality itself. Isolationist 
cognitive science tended to depict rationality in terms of semantically apt transitions 
between inner mental states. Turing’s achievement, as repeatedly stressed by Jerry 
Fodor47 was to show how such transitions could be supported by a mechanical 
process. The environmentally extended approach just mooted does not reject that 
account. It may (and should) incorporate Turing’s central idea of inner processes 
whose syntactic48 properties preserve semantic relations. But this will be just part of a 
larger theory that allows rational behavior to supervene on wider weds of structure 
involving other agents and aspects of the local environment. 
 
47For example, see the comments on p. 277-278 of his Replies to Critics, in B. Loewer & 
G. Rey (eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor & his critics (Blackwell: Oxford), p. 255-319. 
48Syntactic properties are any non-semantic properties that can be directly exploited by a 





                                                
Finally, a worry about complexity. Even if the general project sketched in this 
paper proves attractive (the project of bridging between interaction-based models and 
environmentally decoupled, representation-involving, reason), there remains a worry 
concerning the potential complexity of the inner vehicles of content. The worry already 
touched on in Section 2, is that the inner vehicles may be too spatially and temporally 
complex to effectively isolate. The worry gains force from recent demonstrations of the 
role of recurrent connections49 in modulating the information-processing profile of 
neuronal populations50 and from the sheer difficulty of assigning specific content 
bearing roles to tracts of neural machinery. These complexities and difficulties can 
lead to a subtly different kind of scepticism in which it is the complexity of the inner 
story itself (not the inner-outer interaction) that is supposed to make trouble for the 
representational analysis. 
The issues here are more purely empirical and it is impossible given the current 
state of research, to make any firm predictions. But one clear possibility is that new 
analytic tools may yet provide the means to identify functionally important patterns of 
activity. Dynamical systems analyses, of the kind sometimes promoted as an 
alternative to the representational approach, may in fact serve against the backdrop of 
burgeoning spatial and temporal complexity. This possibility is clearly noted by van 
Gelder51 himself, who allows that “an exciting feature of the dynamical approach is 
 
49Knierim, J., & VanEssen, D. (1992). Visual Cortex: Cartography, Connectivity and 
Concurrent Processing. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 2, 150-155. 
50"What might be cognition be...” op cit, p. 376. 




                                                                                                                                                    
that it offers opportunities for dramatically reconceiving the nature of representation in 
cognitive systems.” Internal representations, then, may be realized not as simple inner 
states but as dynamical patterns of just about any conceivable kind. Such patterns 
may, in addition, be transient entities that form only in response to the details of 
current context. We thus better appreciate the limits of the “inner vehicle” metaphor 
itself. Such vehicles need be neither simple nor persisting52 in order to play a 
representational role . 
 
impossible. The point is just that the space of internal representational vehicles may be much 
larger than the space of persisting inner states. 
52See papers in Port, R., & Gelder, T. V. (Eds.). (1995). Mind as Motion: Dynamics, 
Behavior, and Cognition . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Van Gelder’s concession is important. He does not take himself to have shown 
that there are no internal representations. Just that there might not be any, and that if 
there are they may take a very different form to the one we once expected. I have tried 
to show that the specific skeptical considerations he advances (concerning the 




contact with the represenationalist hypothesis, which is grounded in our capacities for 
environmentally decoupled reason. The ‘revisionary representationalist’ option, 
however, is both appealing and increasingly in evidence in actual cognitive scientific 
applications. 
In sum, our vision of basic biological reason in rapidly changing. There is a 
growing emphasis on the computational economies afforded by real-world action and 
our growing appreciation of the way larger structures (of agent and artifacts) both 
scaffold and transform the shape of individual reason. These twin forces converge on 
a rather more minimalist account of individual cognitive processing -- an account that 
tends to eschew rich, all-purpose internal models and sentential forms of internal 
representations. Such minimalism, however, has its limits. Despite some ambitious 
arguments, there is currently no reason to doubt the guiding vision of individual agents 
as loci of internal representations and users of a variety of inner models. Rather than 
opposing representationalism against interactive dynamics, we should be  embracing 
a broader vision of the inner representational vehicles and seeking the continuities 
between rich interactive strategies and off-line, environmentally de-coupled, reason. 
The reward may be a better vision of reflective agency itself. 
 
 
 
